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BUILDING CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY: AN EXTEN-
SION OF MACPHERSON V. BUICK
Patrick Moran was killed in an explosion and fire re-
sulting from the rupture of a large storage tank containing
liquefied natural gas. The tank was built in Cleveland, Ohio,
for the East Ohio Gas Company by the Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Company. Pittsburgh-Des Moines had finished
work and relinquished control to East Ohio thirteen months
before the accident. Moran, an office employee of East
Ohio, was engaged in work within the area of the tank, but
his employment was not directly related to the manufacture
or storage of the natural gas. Moran's administratix sued
Pittsburgh-Des Moines in the United States District Court
for Western Pennsylvania, alleging negligence in the design
and construction of the tank.' The district court dismissed
the action, holding that under Ohio law Pittsburgh-Des
Moines was not liable. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for submission
to a jury, holding that as a matter of Ohio law an independent
contractor can be liable to one injured as a result of negligent
construction, even after the work has been completed and
the structure has been turned over to the owner. Moran
v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, 166 F.2d 908 (C.
C. A. 3rd 1948) ; cert. denied 334 U. S. 847 (1948) .2
1. See n. 33, Moran v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Company, 166
F.2d 908, 916 (C. C. A. 3rd 1948) for specific allegations of
negligence. The tank was the fourth of a group of tanks built
as storage facilities for what was then the only commercial natural
gas liquefication plant of its kind.
2. The Moran case was the first of 78 death cases arising out of the
accident. The majority of these decedents were employed by
Ohio Gas, and their dependents are receiving payments under
the state workmen's compensation law. Ohio Gas had paid out
over $6,000,000 to other people who suffered damages as a result
of the fire. The dependents of those people killed are seeking
damages over and above that which they receive under workmen's
compensation. The benefits under the Ohio law [OHIO GENERAL
CODE § 1465-82 Page 1947)] allow for a weekly payment of not
more than $21.00 per week, this payment to continue during the
period between the date of death and eight years after the date
of injury. However, the amount in any case is not to exceed$7500. In the only one of these cases yet submitted to a jury,
Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., (1949), judgment was
rendered for defendant notwithstanding a $50,000 verdict for
plaintiff. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny Co., Pa.,
noted the result in the Moran case but held that Pennsylvania
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A so-called "general rule," conceived early in the law
of torts, long protected contractors and manufacturers from
liability for negligence to persons with whom they had no
contractual relations.3 Non-liability was rested principally
on the absence of privity of contract.4 A secondary ground,
of more importance in cases dealing with structures attached
to realty than in cases involving chattels, was the fact
that the contractor or manufacturer had no control over the
offending structure or device at the time of plaintiff's in-
jury.5 Exceptions to the rule have been increasingly asserted
as the nation's industry has advanced in magnitude and com-
plexity.6 Indeed, since the famous case of MacPherson v.
Buick7 manufacturers of chattels have quite generally been
held liable for negligent construction of goods which, falling
into the hands of persons not in privity with the manu-
facturers, do some foreseeable injury.8 It is in the field of
law had not reached the point of imposing liability on such facts.
Cf. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 40-1213. Under the Indi-
ana Workmen's Compensation Law, when injury, -or death is caused
by a third person in such a manner as to subject that third person
to liability, the injured employee, or his dependents in case of
death, have an option to take under the terms of the compensa-
tion act or to recover in an action against the third person. Dam-
agees cannot be collected from both sources. If the injured
employee elects to take under the compensation act, the employer
who pays the compensation is subrogated to the rights of the
employee against the third person. Artificial Ice & Coal Storage
Co. v. Ryan, 99 Ind. App. 606, 193 N. E. 710 (1934); Wabash
Water & Light Co. v. Home Tel. Co., 79 Ind. App. 395, 138 N. E.
692 (1923); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Parker, 191
Ind. 686, 134 N. E. 890 (1922).
3. The English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mee. and W.
109, 152 Eng. Rep. 401 (Ex. 1842) is most frequently cited as
establishing this rule. But an inspection of the facts and plead-
ing indicate that such was not the holding of the court. The
verdict for the contractor was on a demurrer to a declaration
drawn on the contract between the defendants and the postmaster-
general, and the plaintiff failed to establish privity between him-
self and the defendant. Only dicta indicated that the court be-
lieved no recovery could be had in an action founded in tort.
4. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (App. D.C. 1926); Salliotte v. King
Bridge Co., 122 F. 378 (C. C. A. 6th 1903); First Presbyterian
Congregational v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 A. 279 (1894); Curtin
v. Somerset, 140 Pa. St. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891).,
5. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N. E. 1 (1918);
Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, 110 N. J. L. 326, 164 A. 423 (1932);
Mayor of Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165 (1849).
6. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 (1882); Smith v. N. Y. & H. R. Co.,
19 N. Y. 127 (1859); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
7. 217 N. Y. 382, I11 N. E. 1050 (1916).
8. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. U. S., 69 F. Supp. 609 (D. C. Me. 1947);
White Sewing Mach. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N. W. 637
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structures affixed to realty that traditional law has been
most reluctant to yield, for not until 1909 did an American
court take cognizance of the changes that had occurred in
the sizes and design of buildings and other structures and
the attendant increased potentialities for injury to person
and property.9 Privity of contract as the aegis of the slip-
shod builder was abolished, first in the case of bridges, 0 and
later in regard to such structures as steam boilers,' railroad
tracks12 and crossings, 3 and public-4 and private15 buildings.
Concomitantly, absence of control has waned in im-
portance as an exculpatory factor. Many courts now say
that a contractor continues liable where work is turned over
by him in a condition so negligently defective as to be im-
minently dangerous to third persons.'6 Although most courts
have continued to use this language, more recently courts in
(1927); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832
(1924).
9. Penn. Steel Co. v. Elmore & H. Contracting Co., 175 F. 176 (C.
C. A. 3rd 1909).
10. Penn. Steel Co. v. Ehnore & H. Contracting Co., supra note 9;
O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N. W. 1012
(1910).
11. Gildbride v. Leffel, 47 N. E.2d 1015 (Ohio 1942).
12. Bryson v. Hines, 268 F. 290 (C. C. A. 4th 1920).
13. Harriman v. N. Y., Chicago & St. L. Ry., 253 N. Y. 398, 171
N. E. 686 (1930).
14. Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N. W. 563
(1939).
15. Kowalshy v. Corneco Co., 260 N. Y. S. 668 (1932).
16. See Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 581,
14 N. -E.2d 339, 342 (1938); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah
518, 231 P. 832, 835 (1924). From the continued use of the
adverb "so," it would appear that something more than mere
negligence is required to hold the contractor liable. However,
no case appears to require a plaintiff to prove something more
than ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant in per-
forming his work, selecting his materials, or preparing the design
of the structure. But cf. Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518,
231 P. 832, 835, 838 (1924) where the court said, "to render an
independent contractor liable for damages after the work has been
accepted by the contractee, the contractor must be guilty of some-"
thing more than mere negligence. In addition to negligence, the
contractor must have knowledge of the imminence of the danger."
This added element, it will be observed, does not go to increase
the degree of negligence that must be proved, but rather it re-
quires an awareness of the danger. The court qualified this re-
quirement by saying that knowledge is sufficiently shown if the
contractor knew, or under the particular circumstances should
have known his work might prove dangerous. Negligence, there-
fore, remains mere negligence and knowledge is nothing more
than that which is determined by the reasonable-man test.
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a few jurisdictions17 have found support in the rule adopted
by the Restatement of Torts. Section 385 of the Restate-
ment,18 without bothering to give lipservice to the fast-fading
general rule, places the contractor whose negligent work
has been accepted by the possessor of the land under the
same liability as is the manufacturer of a chattel for the
use of others. The Moran case, the first case resting on
this section of the Restatement of Torts, 9 represents the
complete overthrow of the language and the reasoning of the
old general rule with respect to negligent contractors.
In jurisdictions which adopt the rule of the Moran case
the liability of a contractor will be restricted only by the
customary limitations of negligence: risk and duty, and
legal cause.2 0  In holding that Pittsburgh-Des Moines might
17. See Law v. Railway Express Agency, 111 F.2d 427 (C. C. A. 1st
1940); Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 289 N. W.
563 (1939).
18. See also, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 394-398, 403, 404 (1939).
19. "We have not found any Ohio case which presents this question
on its facts unless Gilbride v. Leffel, 47 N. E.2d 1015 (Ohio 1942),
is such a one. In that case the article alleged to have been de-
fective was a boiler and we do not know from reading the de-
cision whether the boiler was affixed to the realty or not. It
might have been and probably was, but it is not so expressly
stated. The Ohio decisions cited and discussed in this opinion
cite, quote, and follow fully the analysis of the problem of liability
as it is set out in the Restatement of Torts. We have no doubt
than an Ohio court confronted with the question would . . .
extend the liability . . . even though the structure was affixed
on another's land." Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,
166 F.2d 908, 916 (C. C. A. 3rd 1948).
20. That the courts of Indiana has shown a tendency to adopt a similar
view was determined in the case of McCloud v. Leavitt, 79 F.
Supp. 286 (1948). In that case the plaintiff had been injured
in the collapse of negligently made bleacher seats which were
manufactured by the Leavett Corporation for Purdue University.
The court analyzed the cases of Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj,
105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N. E.2d 339 (1938) and Coca Cola Bottling
Works of Evansville v. Williams, 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N. E.2d
702 (1941), and found that in both of these cases the Indiana
Appellate Court had recognized exceptions to the general rule of
non-liability where the article is so negligently constructed as to
be imminently dangerous. In Coca Cola v. Williams, supra, the
court cited MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050
(1916), with apparent approval, as having greatly restricted the
general rule. In both of these cases the Supreme Court of Indiana
denied transfer. While admitting that these cases had not
expressly repudiated the rule of non-liability, the federal judge
concluded that a reasonable inference to be drawn from the lan-
guage used, and the fact that transfer was denied, was that Indi-
ana had, in effect accepted the exceptions steming from Mac-
Pherson v. Buick, supra. This being so, the court concluded that
in a tort action there is no necessity of proving privity between
the parties. Further, since liability is based on negligence and
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be liable for Moran's wrongful death, the court did not limit
the duty of the negligent builder to those persons who must
work on the defective structure and whose injury might be
especially foreseen. In relation to the builder, Moran stood
in the same position as any member of the public who might
foreseeably live or come within the orbit of risk created
by the negligent construction. The builder owes a duty of
due care to all persons within that orbit.21
The factors to be weighed in considering the question
of causation in structure cases are indicated by the present
decision. Under the old rule of non-liability, after the con-
tractor or builder had turned over the completed work to
the owner the chain of causation between the contractor's
negligence and the injury was considered broken.22  Courts
have supported this rule either by pointing to positive acts
of the owner in altering the structure, or by saying that
"the negligence of the owner in maintaining the defective
building, and not that of the builder in constructing it, is
the true proximate cause of the third person's injury."23 As
regards positive acts of alteration by the owner, the Moran
rule does not constitute a departure from the rule of non-li-
ability; it is a question of fact in each case whether or not the
owner's positive acts operated as an intervening cause.24 But
the case does indicate that a builder cannot excuse himself for
injuries caused by his defective work simply by invoking
the additional negligence of the owner in accepting the
work prepared by the builder. General principles of causa-
tion have never recognized such an excuse as exonerating
a negligent actor of responsibility for his torts.2 5  If some
foreseeability, the fact that the contractee has accepted the per-
formance is immaterial. On this interpretation of the Indiana
law, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.
21. See Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 206 Minn. 527, 533, 289 N. W.
563, 565 (1935); Gilbride v. Leffel, 47 N. E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ohio
1942).
22. See Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253, 254 (App. D. C. 1926); Travis
v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 82, 122 N. E. 1, 2 (1918).
23. See Ford v. Sturgis, supra, note 22.
24. See PaossER, TORTS § 50 (1941), "... the duties of the court
in any case where proximate cause is involved are as follows:
(2) The determination of causation in fact, in any case
where reasonable men could not differ. . . . In cases where
reasonable men might differ-which will include all but a few
of the cases in which the issue is in dispute at all-the question
is one for the jury."
25. See HARPER, TORTS § 115 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (1941).
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irrational exception has existed to protect contractors,26 it
will no longer be adhered to in jurisdictions where the Moran
rule becomes law. The rule is simple: the contractor will
be held to answer for conduct which creates a foreseeable
risk of a structural accident.
The result of the case seems commendable. Quite pos-
sibly the Moran rule will supply a coercive incentive to the
contractor to avoid negligent construction; if it does the
rule will afford the public a measure of preventive protec-
tion. It clearly provides redress for the injured plaintiff
in the form of an additional solvent defendant. Nor is it
likely that increased liability upon contractors will have
deleterious effects on the industrial economy. Predictions
of injurious effects caused by extending the liability of
industry were made as early as Winterbottom v. Wright,27
and have been frequently repeated thereafter. At the least,
it cannot be proved that these dire prophecies have been
fulfilled; indications are to the contrary. The automotive in-
dustry, in its infancy when the decision in MacPherson v.
Buick was handed down, has since grown to be one of the
largest in the nation.2 8 There seems to be no reason why
the contractor engaged in the erection of structures on land
is not equally able to-bear increased risks and yet prosper.
Obviously the contractor can protect himself by using
his utmost skill to avoid building defective structures or
following defective designs and plans. There is, in addi-
tion, the familiar fact that he can procure liability insurance
to shift his losses caused by accidents that do occur. It is
a truism to repeat that the cost of this greater degree of
care and of liability insurance can be included in the expense
of operation and thereby be absorbed by the public.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. "Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences to which I can see no limit, would ensue." 10 Mee.
& W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).
28. The net sales of General Motors Corporation, of which Buick
Motor Company is a division, rose from $96,295,741 in 1917 to$3,815,159,163 in 1947. Moody, MANUAL OF INVESTmENTs 2215
(1948).
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